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Violence seems to be on a long-term decline in the international system. The possibility that climate
change would create more violent conﬂict was mentioned in scattered places in the Third and Fourth
Assessment Reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), published in 2001 and
2007 respectively. The empirical literature testing for relationships between climate change and various
forms of conﬂict has undergone a major expansion since then. The report from Working Group II of the
Fifth Assessment Report contains a much more careful assessment of the climate change-conﬂict nexus.
The Human security chapter reports high agreement and robust evidence that human security will be
progressively threatened as the climate changes. But as far as the impact on armed conﬂict is concerned,
it paints a balanced picture, concluding that while individual studies vary in their conclusions, ‘collec-
tively the research does not conclude that there is a strong positive relationship between warming and
armed conﬂict’. The chapter also argues that climate change is likely to have an inﬂuence on some known
drivers of conﬂict, and this point is reiterated in other chapters as well as the Technical summary and the
Summary for policymakers. A chapter on ‘Emergent trends…’ has a somewhat more dramatic conclusion
regarding a climate-conﬂict link, as does the Africa chapter, while a methods chapter on ‘Detection and
attribution’ dismisses the climate-change-to-violence link. The entire report is suffused with terms like
‘may’, ‘has the potential to’, and other formulations without any indication of a level of probability.
Overall, the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC does not support the view that climate change is an
important threat to the long-termwaning of war. Still, the report opens up for conﬂicting interpretations
and overly alarmist media translations.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).New threats to security?
Globally, in the ﬁrst decade after World War II, an average of
some 300,000 people per year died in battle-related violence. In the
ﬁrst decade in the newMillennium the ﬁgure had shrunk to around
44,000. An inﬂuential argument has beenmade that this is part of a
broad and long-term decline in the use of violence in human affairs
(Pinker, 2011). However, theworld is not yet a peaceful place by any
means, and the decline in armed group violence is certainly not
monotonic. Many potential threats to peace have been proposed,
including environmental change, and more speciﬁcally climate
change. For instance, United Kingdom and Germany have pushedOslo (PRIO), P. O. Box 9229,
editsch), ragnhild@prio.org
Ltd. This is an open access article ufor climate change to be recognized as a security issue by the UN
Security Council and the Council has held three debates on the
issue (2007, 2011, 2013). In the most recent session, Germany's
representative stated that ‘with the current trends of CO2 emis-
sions, climate change will continue and lead us into a 4 degrees
scenario with devastating consequences e with a high risk to
economic growth and a grave threat to peace and security.’
(German Mission to the UN, 2013). In academic circles, strong
statements have also been made about a climate-conﬂict link.
Notably, a prominently published article by Burke, Miguel,
Satyanath, Dykema, and Lobell (2009) foresaw 393,000 additional
battle-related deaths in sub-Saharan Africa over a 28-year period
up to 2030 if temperatures continued to rise and new conﬂicts were
as deadly as those in the period 1981e2002. However, there is no
consensus in the scholarly community about such dire projections
of future climate wars; in fact most observers conclude that there is
no robust and consistent evidence for an important relationship
between climate change and conﬂict (Bernauer, B€ohmelt, & Koubi,nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013).1
Although climate change is likely to have severe consequences
for people around the world, in particular for already vulnerable
populations, the link to violent conﬂict is a potential but contested
consequence. In this article, we examine how the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has dealt with the question
of a climate-conﬂict nexus in its three most recent assessment re-
ports over the period 2001e14. We focus in particular on the most
recent report fromWorking Group II of the Fifth Assessment Report
(AR5) (IPCC, 2014a), which has by far the most comprehensive
treatment of this issue. While the two previous reports dealt with
the question of a climate-conﬂict nexus in an unsystematic and
sometimes haphazard manner, the Human security chapter of the
new report (Ch 12) presents a more balanced and comprehensive
assessment. However, there are signiﬁcant inconsistencies between
different chapters in AR5. Other problems with IPCC's evaluation of
the climate-conﬂict nexus are the lack of clear adjudication of what
existing evidence shows and a failure to provide a solid assessment
of the probability of future climate conﬂict and its severity if it
occurs.
The IPCC
The IPCC was set up in 1988 as a daughter organization of the
World Meteorological Organization and United Nations Environ-
ment Programme and endorsed by the UN General Assembly
(Hulme &Mahony, 2010). Its task was ‘to provide the world with a
clear scientiﬁc view on the current state of knowledge in climate
change and its potential environmental and socio-economic im-
pacts’ (IPCC, no date). In its reports, the IPCC ‘reviews and assesses
the most recent scientiﬁc, technical and socio-economic informa-
tion produced worldwide ... It does not conduct any research nor
does it monitor climate related data or parameters.’ Governments
endorse the IPCC reports and thus ‘acknowledge the authority of
their scientiﬁc content. The work of the organization is therefore
policy-relevant and yet policy-neutral, never policy-prescriptive.’
The most important documents published by the IPCC are the
highly inﬂuential and widely read Assessment Reports. We
comment on the last three: IPCC (2001), IPCC (2007), and IPCC
(2013a, b, 2014a, b, c).2 All these reports are in three volumes
prepared by different Working Groups. In AR4 and AR5 the WG I
report is titled ‘The Physical Science Basis’, WG II ‘Impacts, Adap-
tation and Vulnerability’, andWG III ‘Mitigation of Climate Change’.
The WG II report deals with the social consequences of climate
change, which is our main focus here.3
The reports are prepared by panels of academics. Individual
chapters are sent out for review at least twice. In the ﬁnal stages,
the reports are also reviewed by governments (IPCC, 2013a). As
noted by the IPCC, this commits governments to accepting the re-
ports as valid summaries of the state of knowledge, but it also
potentially opens up for political pressure. Reviewers are asked to
comment on drafts and suggest revisions, but the review process is
not blinded. The selection of authors for the various chapters can
potentially be inﬂuenced by political concerns. As a minimum, the
logic for selecting authors is based on a strong priority to having
representation of authors with different nationalities, rather than
based exclusively on picking the world-leading experts on the
various topics. The national processes for nomination of authors
vary (IPCC, 1999).
Since the IPCC does not conduct any research itself, it depends
on existing publications up to a certain cut-off date. Generally, the
IPCC relies on peer-reviewed research, but also uses other sources,
such as industry journals, unpublished working papers, and
workshop proceedings. This is particularly common inWG II, whichsummarizes the social science research about the consequences of
climate change. A wide-ranging examination of the IPCC by the
InterAcademy Council (IAC, 2010: 18), an international body set up
by national academies of science, acknowledged that some gov-
ernments, particularly in developing countries, had not always
nominated the best experts, that the author-selection process suf-
fered from a lack of transparency, and that the regional chapters did
not always make use of experts from outside the region. It also cited
a study that found that while 84 percent of the sources for IPCC's
Working Group 1 on the physical science basis derived from peer-
reviewed sources, it was only 59 percent for Working Group 2 on
the vulnerability of socio-economic and natural systems to climate
change (IAC, 2010: 16).
Conﬂict in the IPCC assessment reports
In an early critical summary of research on climate change and
conﬂict in this journal we argued that the ﬁeld of climate-conﬂict
research was weakly developed and that the IPCC had little sys-
tematic research to draw on (Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007). We
concluded that, in order to move forward, the scholarly community
should give priority to: disentangling the various potential effects
of climate change on conﬂict; promoting a closer coupling of
climate change models and conﬂict models; considering what
kinds of violence we expect to result from climate change;
attempting to balance positive and negative effects of climate
change as well as the effects of various strategies of adaptation; and
focusing on consequences for areas particularly vulnerable to
conﬂict. Since then, there has been amajor expansion of research in
this ﬁeld, and a series of studies have addressed these points.
Hence, the most recent report from the IPCC (2014a) has a much
larger body of evidence to synthesize. This is apparent when
assessing how the climate-conﬂict nexus has featured in the IPCC
reports from 2001 to 2014.4
In an earlier study (Nordås & Gleditsch, 2013) we reported an
extensive search in the then two most recent IPCC Assessment
Reports (2001, 2007) carried out in order to evaluate the IPCC's
treatment of the relationship between climate change and armed
conﬂict. The following search proﬁle was applied to all substantive
parts of the IPCC reports:
‘armed’ OR ‘conﬂict’ OR ‘violen’ OR ‘war’
The term ‘violen’ captures ‘violence’ as well as ‘violent’. By
searching for all instances of these terms, ‘conﬂict’ also yields hits
for ‘conﬂicts’, ‘conﬂict-ridden’, ‘conﬂicting’, etc. The term ‘war’ in-
cludes ‘wars’, ‘warlike’, etc. More limited searches in AR4 using a
wider list of search terms (including ‘riot’, ‘uprising’, ‘insurrection’,
‘revolution’, ‘genocide’, ‘massacre’) did not yield additional hits, and
we found no indication that a wider search would have yielded
additional material (Nordås & Gleditsch, 2013).
Occurrences of the search terms were classiﬁed into irrelevant
hits (such as when ‘war’ picks upWorldWar II), ‘conﬂict’ is found in
‘conﬂicting priorities’, or ‘violen’ occurs in ‘violent cyclones’, low
relevance hits (e.g. where ‘conﬂict’ refers to conﬂict of interest
without violence; or where the reference is to consequences of
conﬂict), medium relevance (where climate change is believed to
increase the duration or severity of on-going conﬂicts), and high
relevance (where it is argued that violent conﬂict has been caused
by climate change or by a resource scarcity which is likely to be
exacerbated by climate change). In this article, we extend the
analysis to AR5.
In our analysis of TAR and AR4, we assessed each of the high-
relevance hits, studied the evidence for the statements, including
whether it was based on peer-reviewed research, and tried to trace
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reproduce conventional wisdom or hearsay or end up in a circular
pattern. Because the search terms occur so much more frequently
in AR5, we cannot go into individual instances in the same detail
here; but have traced sources for high-relevance hits in cases where
we were unfamiliar with the publications or uncertain about the
evidence base.
Table 1 shows the frequency of the four terms in the three
searches. The incidence of ‘conﬂict’ and the three related terms fell
radically from TAR to AR4, but rose to new heights in AR5. This is
not surprising in view of the fact that Chapter 12 was allocated to
‘Human security’, with a special section devoted to conﬂict. Clearly,
the IPCC now pays more attention to the possibility of conﬂict as a
result of climate change, but this does not in itself tell us how the
IPCC assesses this possible link. We now turn to a substantive
discussion of the three most recent assessment reports.
TAR
Most of the over one hundred occurrences of the word ‘conﬂict’
in the TARwere irrelevant or of lowormedium relevance. The high-
relevance cases discussed the potential for ‘water wars’, conﬂicts
generated by climate change-induced migration, or resource wars
in the wake of climatic shifts.
The general tenor of the discussion of ‘water wars’ is that
‘negative trends in water availability have the potential to induce
conﬂict between different users’ (IPCC, 2001: 84). However, the
sources cited for this view provide no evidence for it. In fact, while
frequent threats can be cited, outbreaks of interstate violence over
water have been rare or even non-existent (Wolf, 1998). Some of
the sources also stress that water is more frequently a source of
cooperation, even between countries that have gone to war on
other issues, such as India and Pakistan (Dellapenna, 1999). TAR
cites the widely publicized ‘water conﬂict chronology’ developed
by Gleick (1998), but overlooks that few of the listed conﬂicts
involve any actual violence and thatmost concern the use (or threat
of use) of water as a weapon in an on-going conﬂict. TAR's chapter
on Africa (Ch 10) argues that along with resource degradation and
population growth, water scarcity can create conﬂict, but no sour-
ces are cited for this claim (IPCC, 2001: 495). Ironically, both TAR
and AR4 ignore academic empirical work that concludes that
shared water resources in international rivers are associated with
an increased risk of conﬂict (Furlong, Gleditsch, & Hegre, 2006;
Toset, Gleditsch, & Hegre, 2000).5
In discussing the possibility that climate change could lead to
migration that in turn would generate conﬂict over resources, the
TAR follows many NGO and policy reports in citing the warnings byTable 1
The use of terms indicating conﬂict or violence in recent IPCC WG II reports.
Report TAR AR4 AR5
Year 2001 2007 2014
Term
Irrelevant 47 10 9
Low relevance 37 57 27
Medium relevance 6 4 50
High relevance 27 10 169
Sum 117 45 255
Pages in report 1032 987 2635
Number of occurrences of terms from the search proﬁle. Based on electronic
searches in theWG II reports on-line. The search in TAR includes some hits fromWG
III on mitigation. Since the TAR is no longer available in electronic form, we cannot
eliminate these hits, but they are in any case few relative to WG II. A more detailed
analysis of the discussion of conﬂict in TAR and AR4 is found in Nordås and Gleditsch
(2013).Myers (1993) about up to 200 million future ‘climate refugees’.
However, it is generally recognized that this ﬁgure represents
guesswork rather than a scientiﬁcally-based estimate. Another
cornerstone of this discussion is the work of Homer-Dixon (1991,
1999), which argues the case for resource scarcity as an impor-
tant contributing cause of conﬂict, exempliﬁed by several case
studies. However, the TAR does not mention the widespread criti-
cism of Homer-Dixon’s work, that it selects on the dependent
variable and fails to consider whether cases on non-war might have
equally serious scarcities (see e.g. Gleditsch, 1998; Levy, 1995).
AR4
By 2007 there was increasing public concern about the security
implications of climate change, as indicated by for instance the
calling of a ﬁrst special session of the UN Security Council on the
topic (UN, 2007), as well as the Nobel Peace Prize Award to the IPCC
and Al Gore. However, AR4 WG II, which was published that year,
was ﬁnished too early to be inﬂuenced by these events. In fact, as
noted in Table 1, our search terms occurred less frequently in AR4,
perhaps because the IPCC had strengthened its standards and
realized that the amount of peer-reviewed systematic research was
still limited. AR4 does contain some references to a possible
climate-conﬂict link, but not many. Most of the high-relevance
items are found in the Africa chapter (Ch 9) and the Synthesis
report does not contain any.
As in TAR, the prospect of ‘water conﬂict’ surfaces in AR4 (IPCC,
2007: 299) in a guarded formulation that climate change can
potentially lead to conﬂict via competition for water resources.
However, the basis for this appears to be a two-page article in a
newsletter (Lopez, 2004) that explains why, despite the potential
for conﬂict, three countries in Central America have achieved
transborder cooperation on water issues. The three other high-
relevance references are similarly cautiously worded and weakly
founded. Thus, they offer little or no support for a climate-change-
to-armed-conﬂict scenario.
The Africa chapter contained 11 references to the search terms,
more than any other chapter. Most of these are classiﬁed as of
medium relevance, but there are three ‘high relevance’ hits. Still,
none of the works cited provides much evidence that climate
change will cause violent conﬂict.
The Fifth assessment report, AR56
As noted in Table 1, the AR5 has much more frequent references
to conﬂict (and the other search terms) than the earlier reports.
Most of them occur in the Human security chapter (Ch 12), which
has a 4½ page section on conﬂict (12.5). However, there is also fairly
extensive discussion of conﬂict in Ch 19 on Emergent risks and key
vulnerabilities and in Ch 22 on Africa, a brief but important section
in Ch 18 Detection and attribution of observed impacts, as well as
smaller comments in 20 other substantive or regional chapters, as
well as the two summary chapters (Technical summary, TS, and
Summary for policymakers, SPM). There is considerable cross-
referencing, so many other chapters refer to the main points
about conﬂict from the Human security chapter, which also brings
up the total number of hits for our search terms.
The Human security chapter
Overall, the treatment of conﬂict in the Human security chapter
is balanced. It relies exclusively on published sources7, most of
which are probably peer-reviewed, and well reﬂects the state of the
literature. It cites studies that argue that large-scale climate change
is associated with war and the collapse of empires, but cautions
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transferable to the contemporary globalized world’ (pp. 15e16). In
summarizing the literature on short-term warming and armed
conﬂict, the chapter concludes that ‘Some of these studies ﬁnd a
weak relationship, some ﬁnd no relationship, and collectively the
research does not conclude that there is a strong positive rela-
tionship between warming and armed conﬂict’ (p. 16). The authors
also cite various studies on rainfall deviations and civil war. Here,
again, some studies ﬁnd a relationship and others do not. ‘There is
high agreement that in the speciﬁc circumstances where other risk
factors are extremely low (such as where per capita incomes are
high, and states are effective and consistent), the impact of changes
in climate on armed conﬂict is negligible.’ (p.16) All of this is fully in
line with previous summaries of the literature, such as Bernauer,
B€ohmelt & Koubi (2012), Gleditsch (2012), Scheffran et al. (2012),
and Theisen et al. (2013). The study by Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel
(2013), to which we return below, says otherwise. But in the Hu-
man security chapter the latter study is treated as one of several
literature summaries, and not given additional weight, although
there is a cross-reference to Ch 19 (p. 25).
The chapter notes that there is ‘some agreement’ that climate
variability is associated with non-state conﬂicts (generally smaller
and localized conﬂicts), but that the risk is mediated by the pres-
ence of conﬂict-management institutions.
The chapter ﬁnds that ‘Many of the factors that increase the risk
of civil war and other armed conﬂicts are sensitive to climate
change’, citing poverty, slow economic growth, economic shocks,
and inconsistent political institutions (p. 17). This is not contro-
versial. However, there are (at least) three problems here: First,
none of the studies on climate and conﬂict, with the possible
exception of literature on heat and individual aggression, assume
that climate has a direct inﬂuence on violence. The assumption,
usually if not always made explicit, is that climate change (be it
increasing heat or changes in precipitation) inﬂuences other fac-
tors, which in turn lead to conﬂict. Without these intervening
factors (or mechanisms) the relationship between climate change
and conﬂict simply cannot be understood. Thus, it is misleading to
say ﬁrst that ‘collectively the research does not conclude that there
is a strong positive relationship between warming and armed
conﬂict’ and then go on to posit a link nevertheless because
warming will inﬂuence well-known and established risk factors.8
Secondly, correlations are not transitive (except when they are
very high, cf. Langford, Schwertman,& Owens, 2001). Thus, it is not
a given that establishing a link from A to B and from B to C is suf-
ﬁcient to establish empirically a link from A to C. (For instance, if a
modest correlation from A to B is driven by one subset of cases and
a correlation from B to C by another, A and C are unlikely to be
linked at all.) What the chapter authors might usefully have done
here is to look for studies that have explicitly examined the two-
stage process, from climate change to the risk factors and from
the risk factors to conﬂict. Few studies so far have attempted this.
Two studies that have done so are Koubi, Bernauer, Kalbhenn, and
Spilker (2012) and Bergholt and Lujala (2012). Neither of these
articles provides much support for the AeC link. Both of them are
cited in the Human security chapter, but the point about the lack of
transitivity in the two-stage process is missed.
Finally, to strengthen the ﬁrst part of the proposed indirect link
from climate change to civil war, a cross-reference to Ch 10 (on the
economic effects of climate change) would have been useful. This
chapter is quite modest when it comes to the global economic ef-
fects expected to result from global warming: ‘For most economic
sectors, the impact of climate change will be small relative to the
impacts of other drivers’ (Ch 10: 3). Globally aggregated economic
impacts of global warming are a small fraction of income up until
3 C… . A global mean average temperature rise of 2.5 C may leadto global aggregated economic losses between 0.2 and 2.0% of in-
come …’. This refers to a loss in the level of annual income rather
than to a drop in the growth rate of the economy. The time-frame is
not speciﬁed, but one of the CLAs of the chapter has written else-
where that the global loss of GDP over a ﬁfty-year period is less
than an average year's economic growth (Tol, 2014).9 Thus, at the
level of global warming currently foreseen, we are not facing a
major global economic upheaval. Of course, as Ch 10 notes,
‘aggregate impacts hide large differences between and within
countries’. Also, climate could be one of the causes why some
countries are trapped in poverty, and climate change may make it
harder to escape poverty, although Ch 10 emphasizes that the ev-
idence is thin and contradictory. Hence, the robust ﬁnding that
poor countries have more civil war (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006) is by
no means irrelevant, but must be tempered by the potential for
redistribution in a world that will be on average much wealthier. In
the WG III on mitigation, published two weeks after the WG II
report, the chapter on ‘Economics of adaptation’ (Ch 17) suggests
that the global adaptation costs will be between $70 billion and
$100 billion globally by 2050. Although the authors qualify this by
saying that ‘there is little conﬁdence in these numbers’, this re-
inforces the relative optimism of theWG II report with regard to the
economic consequences of climate change. This obviously has
important implications for the possible role of economic factors in
generating conﬂict.
Apart from titles in the bibliography, there are no references in
the Human security chapter (or in the rest of the WG II report) to
‘water wars’10 or, for that matter, to ‘environmental security’.
Although the term ‘climate refugee’ occurs frequently in the ref-
erences in the Human security chapter, in the main text it only
turns up once in order for the authors to note that the term is
‘scientiﬁcally and legally problematic’. The chapter reviews a
number of studies that reject thewidely-reported view that climate
change was a major driver of the conﬂict in Darfur and instead
identify government practices as far more inﬂuential.
Although the Human security chapter is cautious about drawing
conclusions about the relationship between climate change and
conﬂict, there is little question about its conclusion with regard to
the general issue of human security: ‘Human security will be pro-
gressively threatened as the climate changes (high agreement,
robust evidence)’ (Ch 12: 2). The chapter acknowledges the variety
of deﬁnitions of human security and chooses to deﬁne it very
widely ‘as a condition that exists when the vital core of human lives
is protected, and when people have the freedom and capacity to
live with dignity. In this assessment, the vital core of human lives
includes the universal and culturally speciﬁc, material and non-
material elements necessary for people to act on behalf of their
interests.’ (Ch 12: 3). The chapter ﬁnds that climate change is a
threat to human security because it undermines livelihoods, com-
promises culture and identity, induces migration that people would
rather have avoided, and challenges the ability of states to provide
the conditions necessary for human security.
Other scholars apply much narrower deﬁnitions. For instance,
Human Security Report (Mack, 2005: viii), widely read but not cited
in the WG II report, limits human security to the protection of in-
dividuals from the threat of violence. This approach allows statis-
tical tracking of the ups and downs of human security through
numbers on interstate and civil war, group conﬂicts and one-sided
violence, and violent crime. By contrast, the deﬁnition in the Hu-
man security chapter is toowide to allow serious attempts to assess
the secular trend. For some forms of human security that are close
to the narrower deﬁnition (such as fatal victims of climate-related
natural disasters, Ch 12: 25), one can obtain a yardstick for
measuring whether human security is generally increasing or
decreasing, but for even broader aspects it becomes very difﬁcult. In
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this trend attributable to climate change. There is a real danger that
any kind of social change disliked by some group becomes a threat
to someone's human security. For instance, the amount of ‘migra-
tion that people would rather have avoided’ must be considerable,
but is hardly measurable. And even if it were, would this entity be
of much interest unless we can say something about the actual
consequences of the move? Globalization generally gets a bad
rating in the human security literature (featuring as a stressor and,
along with climate change, putting people in double jeopardy, cf.
Leichenko & O'Brien, 2008), but for many people it also is associ-
ated with higher income and a better life. As Mack (2005: viii)
notes, a concept of human security that is overly broad may be
useful for advocacy, but has limited utility for policy analysis.
Emergent risks
Chapter 19 deals with ‘Emergent risk and key vulnerabilities’. An
emergent risk is deﬁned as ‘A risk that arises from the interaction of
phenomena in a complex system’ (Ch 19: 13). Speciﬁcally, this re-
fers to the interaction between climate-generated hazards with the
vulnerability of societies or ecosystems (Ch 19: 14). This chapter
ﬁnds climate change to be an emergent risk because, as argued in
Chapter 12 and elsewhere, factors such as poverty and economic
shocks that are associated with conﬂict are inﬂuenced by climate
change. However, as already pointed out, these are intervening
factors, mechanisms that are hypothesized e and sometimes
demonstrated e to explain why climate change is associated with
more conﬂict. The interaction of climate change with economic and
political factors and the possible effects of such interactions on
conﬂict is a different matter, which has been lacking in much of the
research on the climate-conﬂict nexus. (One exception is Fjelde &
von Uexkull, 2012: 444, which ﬁnds that ‘the effect of rainfall
shortages on the risk of communal conﬂict is ampliﬁed in regions
inhabited by politically excluded ethno-political groups’, but this
study is not cited in Ch 19.) This chapter also relies heavily on
Hsiang et al. (2013), which is described as the ‘onlymeta-analysis in
the literature’.11 That study, however, is neither about interaction
effects nor about mechanisms. This discussion would therefore
appear to have been more appropriately located in the Human
security chapter e except that the authors of that chapter chose to
attribute less inﬂuence to it. The outcome, that the substance of the
Hsiang et al. (2013) article is not discussed in the Human security
chapter but in the Emergent risk chapter, is hard to understand
except possibly as a political compromise.
Detection and attribution
The hardest blow to the hypothesized climate-conﬂict nexus is
found in an unexpected place, Chapter 18 on ‘Detection and attri-
bution of observed impacts’. The essence of this chapter is to assess
the occurrence of magnitude of ‘changes in climate that deviate
from historical conditions, irrespective of the driver of climate
change.’ The chapter points out that relatively few studies of the
effects of climate change assess speciﬁcally the consequences of
anthropogenic climate change as distinct from natural ﬂuctuations
(Ch 18: 3ff). It is linked directly to the assessments made by most
other chapters in the report, but its deﬁnitions for detection and
attribution differ from those found in other chapters (Ch 18: 5ff).
The chapter also notes that there are substantial challenges to the
detection and assessment of the impacts of climate change on
natural and human systems since virtually all such systems are
affected by factors other than climate change and these need to be
controlled for. Another complication is the ability of many systems
to adapt to climate change (Ch 18: 6). In many ways, this is thechapter most skeptical of excessive claims about the effects of
climate change. This skepticism emerges particularly clearly when
it turns to possible effects of climate change on conﬂict. There seem
to be two reasons for this skepticism: One is that results in the
existing literature that indicate a climate-conﬂict link are con-
tested. Secondly, the empirical literature focuses on interannual
variability rather than climate change. ‘While a plausible argument
could be made that climate change has increased interannual
variability and has, therefore, contributed positively to the rate of
civil conﬂict, this argument has not been tested in the literature.’
(Ch 18: 25) The chapter therefore dismisses the impact of climate
change on civil conﬂict, small-scale communal violence, and vio-
lent crime12, in all the three cases concluding that ‘neither the
detection of an effect of climate change… nor an assessment of the
magnitude of such an effect can currently be made with a high
degree of conﬁdence’ (Ch 18: 25). With regard to interstate war, by
far the most severe armed conﬂicts in the Twentieth Century in
terms of battle deaths, the chapter states categorically (Ch 18: 25)
that ‘there is no evidence of a climate change effect on inter-state
conﬂict in the post-WW II period’.
Africa
The Africa chapter (Ch 22) provides 15 high-relevance hits in our
electronic search, but given the discussion of conﬂict in the three
chapters just reviewed, it is not as important as in AR4 (IPCC, 2007).
TheAfrica chapter repeats the idea fromtheHuman security chapter
that climate changemight affect other factors that are also drivers of
conﬂict. However, in many cases, the wording is cautious and refers
mainly to the potential to exacerbate or multiply existing threats,
including conﬂict. The potential for water conﬂict is mentioned (e.g.
p. 56) but as conﬂict of interest, not necessarily involving violence.13
The chapter's section on violent conﬂict (22.6.1.1) notes that the
environment is rarelyconsidered themost decisive cause of conﬂict;
and that ‘it remains disputed whether, and if so, how, the changing
climate directly increases the risk of violent conﬂict in Africa’ (p. 45).
Here, the debate between Burke et al. (2009) and Buhaug (2010) is
cited. (The debate has continued in Buhaug, 2014; Cane et al., 2014;
Hsiang & Meng, 2014; O'Loughlin, Linke, &Witmer, 2014; Raleigh,
Linke, & O'Loughlin, 2014). However, based on Hsiang et al. (2013),
the Africa chapter goes on to claim that ‘views are emerging that
there is a positive relationship between increases in temperature
and increases in human conﬂict’. As noted, these views are now
sharply contested (Buhaug et al., 2014).
The relationship, if any, between climate change and conﬂict via
migration is presented in vague terms, with reference to ‘interac-
tion of climate change, disaster, conﬂict, displacement, and
migration’ (p. 46). No more detail is given regarding the nature of
this interaction. A single source (Kolmannskog, 2010) is the main
foundation here. This study does not establish a clear link between
climate change and conﬂict and has a very limited empirical base e
49 semi-structured interviews of ‘experts and affected people’
conducted in selected areas in Kenya and Somaliland and what
appears to be an even smaller number of interviews in Burundi. The
reliance on this source is surprising given the extensive literature
on migration, including some studies that discuss a possible link
between climate change and conﬂict via migration (see e.g.
Gleditsch, Salehyan & Nordås, 2007).
The Africa chapter states explicitly that ‘causality between
climate change and violent conﬂict is difﬁcult to establish’ (p. 5), yet
goes on to say on the same page that ‘the degradation of natural
resources as a result of both overexploitation and climate change
will contribute to increased conﬂicts over the distribution of these
resources’. The latter statement is based on Kumssa and Jones
(2010), an article which makes no new contribution to
Fig. 1. Conﬁdence scale building on level of agreement and type of evidence.
Source: Mastrandrea et al. (2010: 3, Fig. 1). Darker shading means higher conﬁdence,
summed up by using ﬁve qualiﬁers: very low, low, medium, high, and very high.
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olent conﬂict, and without any references or empirics to support a
claim about such a link.
The authors
Each substantive chapter has two Coordinating Lead Authors
(CLA) and a number of Lead Authors (LA). In addition, there are
several Contributing Authors (CA), two or three Review Editors (RE),
and some chapters also have a Chapter Scientist (CS) or Voluntary
Chapter Scientist (VCS). The Summary for Policymakers has 72
Drafting Authors, mostly consisting of Coordinating Lead Authors
from the substantive chapters. Richard Tol, one of the two CLAs for
Chapter 10 on the economic effects, withdrew during the drafting of
the SPM because he felt that the summary was becoming overly
alarmist (Reuters, 2014).14 The SPM is the most ‘political’ part of any
IPCC report since representatives of decision-makers participate in
the determination of the ﬁnal wording and it is not the ﬁrst time that
formulations in an SPMcreate controversy. Following the publication
of the report of AR5WG III (onmitigation), it was revealed that there
had been a tug-of-war between different countries on the issue of
fossil fuel subsidies. A formulation in the WG III report now reads ‘...
complete removal of fossil fuel subsidies in all countries could result
in [signiﬁcant] reductions in global aggregate emissions by mid-
century [at negative social cost]’. The bracketed words were
deleted as a last-minute compromise between four oil-producing
countries that wanted the entire sentence deleted and a number of
European countries that wanted it retained (Peters, 2014: 25).
Several CLAs have suggested that ‘the resulting document should
probably be called the Summary by Policymakers, rather than the
Summary for Policymakers’ (Stavins, 2014: 1).
An advance list of authors in AR5 WG II was released by IPCC
(2010). It is clearly incomplete. We have therefore compiled our
own by combining the lists given in the individual chapters. Few
people will be surprised not to ﬁnd the name of Bjørn Lomborg on
the list; omissions like William Nordhaus (the dean of climate
change economics) and Thomas Bernauer (a major contributor to
the political science literature on climate change) are a bit more
surprising.
It would not be surprising if the choice of authors had at least
some inﬂuence on how the literature has been reported in the
various chapters. Solomon Hsiang is a CA for the Emergent risks
chapter, the only chapter that features Hsiang et al. (2013) as ‘[t]he
only meta-analysis of the literature’ and thus raises it to a higher
status, but also for the Detection and attribution chapter, where its
conclusions are implicitly rejected. His co-author Burke is a CA for
the Africa chapter. Although a direct inﬂuence from author to
contents can by no means be inferred, it seems likely that there has
been a tug-of-war over some of the formulations. So far, the
newspaper interviews given by Richard Tol provide the only small
window on this, although some of us who have served as reviewers
can attest to considerable changes over the various drafts, many of
which aremore attributable to interpretations of the literature than
to new studies becoming available at a late stage.15
The strong emphasis on broader aspects of human security in
the Human security chapter is not surprising given the previous
work of CLA Neil Adger, with many of his associates among the LAs
and CAs. In fact, the links in terms of previous co-publication be-
tween the 14 authors and editors of this chapter are so numerous
that it probably would have been worthwhile to seek to broaden
the writing group. While a coherent team no doubt can work
effectively, it can also inadvertently overlook some of the dis-
agreements in the ﬁeld.
Altogether 1729 reviewers commented on earlier versions of
individual chapters. Their names were not listed although some ofthem are known to us. The full list of referees will be posted with
the ﬁnal report. While the Human security chapter did not have a
well-published expert on armed conﬂict on its author team, several
such were consulted as reviewers.
Dealing with uncertainty
Like all trend-based analyses, which build arguments about
future events based on data from the past, the IPCC reports deal in
uncertainties. The question of how to report the degree of certainty
has evolved over the assessment reports (Mastrandrea & Mach,
2011) and has varied between the working groups. Generally, the
IPCC now relies on two metrics: Conﬁdence (expressed qualitatively)
in the validity of a ﬁnding, based on the type, amount, quality, and
consistency of evidence and the degree of agreement and degree of
uncertainty (expressed probabilistically), based on statistical analysis
of observations or model results, or expert judgment. Where there is
high agreement and robust evidence, the lead authors are asked to
present a level of conﬁdence or a quantiﬁed measure of uncertainty
(Mastrandrea et al., 2010: 2f). Where such estimates are possible,
authors are encouraged to provide information on the tails of the
distribution of outcomes, since even low-probability outcomes (such
as meteorite collisions or 100-year ﬂoods) can have signiﬁcant im-
pacts if they are large, persistent, broad, or irreversible. Quantiﬁable
evidence is summed by using a six-point likelihood scale, ranging
from Virtually certain (99e100% probability) to Exceptionally un-
likely (0e1%). For non-quantiﬁable evidence, a two-dimensional
conﬁdence scale is used, as shown in Fig. 1.
This two-dimensional scale is applied frequently in the WG II
report in general, and its use does not seem very controversial. A
much more problematic aspect of the language of the report is the
frequent use of terms like ‘may’, ‘has the potential to’, etc. Clearly,
using such terms means a claim more modest than saying that
something ‘is likely’ to happen. A minimum interpretation of ‘may’
is that the probability of an event is greater than zero. Since it is
extremely rare in social science that we judge the probability of
events to be precisely zero, such a statement is almost devoid of
empirical content. It cannot be distinguished from ‘Exceptionally
unlikely (0e1%)’ in the parts of AR5 that use a quantitative scale. A
more generous interpretation is that ‘may’ means ‘there is a low
probability of an event’ (in other words, lower thanwhat is required
to say ‘is likely’). A legitimate use of ‘may’ would be to pose a hy-
pothesis. But if one is not in a position to test it, then the statement
is left hanging.
Progressively stronger formulations are ‘in some cases’, ‘in many
cases’, and ‘probably’ e the latter can reasonably be interpreted as
meaning that the probability of B occurring as a result of A being
greater than 0.5.
In Table 2, we list some of the terms used in the report that
indicate low-probability relationships. The ﬁnal column contains
terms that state a more general uncertainty (or lack of clarity)
Table 2
Tentative translations of expressions of uncertainty in the WG II report.
p > 0 P >> 0 p >>> 0 p > .5 General uncertainty or lack of clarity
may
might
can
could
has a potential to
is a potential cause of
is sensitive to
is expected to
is capable of
due to
has led to
at the nexus of
undermines
is characterized by
is a driver of
contributes to
in some cases
is reported as
in many cases
are coupled
are particularly
widely used
probably
are closely coupled
will
would
is associated with
increases
exacerbates
there is justiﬁable common concern that
suggests that
raises the question whether
is being increasingly recognized
there is evidence of
Terms that occur in the plural (‘are potential causes of’) have mostly been changed to the singular for consistency. Combinations of these terms also occur, such as ‘could
potentially’ (Ch 8: 22).
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‘There is justiﬁable common concern that’ (climate change leads to
conﬂict) is one such. All of the formulations contained in Table 2 are
found in the WG II report, many of them in the Human security
chapter.
The terms in the left-hand column (i.e. the vaguest ones) are not
only the most numerous but also occur more frequently. We con-
ducted a comparison between the SPMs for WG II and WG I (on the
scientiﬁc basis). While the WG I SPM used ‘may’ words (‘may’,
‘might’, ‘can’, or ‘could’) on average 1.2 time per page, the frequency
in theWG II SPMwas 1.3 and in the Human security chapter 1.9. On
the other hand, ‘will’ words (‘will’ or ‘would’) were used on average
3.6, 0.83, and 0.47 times per page in the three documents. More-
over, in the science report (WG I SPM) the use of ‘may’ and similar
terms mostly occurred in phrases that mentioned a possible
exception from a general rule (‘It is likely that there will be some
decline in the AMOC [Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation]
by about 2050, but there may be some decades when the AMOC
increases due to large natural internal variability …’, p. 24) or to
indicate the impossibility of drawing a ﬁrm conclusion (‘A projec-
tion of when the Arctic might become nearly icefree in September
in the 21st century cannot be made with conﬁdence for the other
scenarios…’, p. 25). On the other hand, a fairly typical sentence in
the Human security chapter expressed a loose causal connection
(‘This Chapter assesses research on how climate change may
exacerbate speciﬁc threats to human security…’, p. 4). The frequent
use of ‘may’ terms might have been justiﬁed as a way of indicating
that ‘under certain circumstances, a relationship is likely’. But this
does not work well if those circumstances are not speciﬁed.
On the whole, it would probably be best to avoid the use of
terms like ‘may’ in academic writing except to state conjectures.
Misrepresentation of the scientiﬁc basis is a real hazard when using
such terminology. There is also a considerable danger that when
material from WG II is cited, ‘may’ will be translated into ‘will’,
particularly when the conclusions of the report are being referred
in media reports or in summaries to policymakers and a general
audience. Thus, a possibly well-meaning attempt to simplify a
message ends up altering the meaning. The difference is illustrated
by the two summary chapters. The TS states that ‘Climate change
indirectly increases risks from violent conﬂict…’ (p. 25), while the
SPM says that ‘Climate change can indirectly increase risks of vio-
lent conﬂicts …’ (p. 20).
A long line of research in psychology indicates that probability
terms expressed inwords rather than numbers are subject to a wide
range of interpretation by observers. Budescu, Broomell, and Por(2009) conducted an experiment that demonstrated that even the
terms used in the WG I quantitative assessment scale (such as
‘virtually certain’ denoting a 99% probability, ‘very likely’ 90%, etc.)
were interpreted variously by their subjects. For instance, in one
statement ‘very likely’ was interpreted to mean probabilities lower
than 70% by one quarter of the subjects. If the interpretation of
standard terms in the IPCC reports is subject to so much uncertainty,
the situation is probably worse for non-standard terms like ‘may’.
In an investigation of management practices in intelligence
agencies, Tetlock and Mellers (2011: 548) criticize ‘the vast majority
of intelligence estimates’ for their reliance on ‘vague-to-the-point-of
nebulous verbal characterizations of the likelihood of outcomes,
including the use of terms like “may” and “is likely to”’. Tetlock &
Mellers interpret the resistance of intelligence agencies to be more
precise to ‘obfuscation: retreating behind opaque verbiage that …
makes it impossible to track relative predictive performance and
impossible to tease apart factual and value judgments …’. Unfortu-
nately, these harsh words apply quite well to the IPCCWG II reports.
Media translations
Although most immediate media reactions were reasonably
accurate and close to the text of the report, dramatic headings
proclaimed disaster in Daily Mail (‘Climate change will lead to war,
famine and extreme weather, claims IPCC report’; Zolfagharifard,
2014), Telegraph (‘IPCC report: global warming to increase heat-
waves, ﬂooding and conﬂict'; Demetriou, 2014), and Independent
(‘IPCC report paints bleak picture of war, famine and pestilence’;
Connor, 2014). From the press conference on the report, one leading
Norwegian newspaper cited the Norwegian Minister of Environ-
ment as saying that she ‘foresees a future with more armed con-
ﬂict’.16 The same paper also cited one of the lead authors of the
Human security chapter as having said that ‘climate change will
increase the risk of violent conﬂict, inter alia because of more
poverty and economic downturns’ (Sandberg, 2014). The trans-
lation of ‘may’ into ‘will’ in this paragraph is precisely what one has
to fear as media rely on theWG II report without having read it very
carefully. Later, it transpired that the WG II Lead author in fact had
not been interviewed by the paper at all and that she stands by the
conclusions of the Human security chapter.17 Another national
Norwegian newspaper has also claimed that the WG II report
concludes that additional violent conﬂict ‘will’ occur as a result of
climate change (Paust, 2014). Even the UN News Center headed its
story: 'Climate change impacting entire planet, raising risk of
hunger, ﬂoods, conﬂict e UN report' (UN, 2014).
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The AR5WG II report generally paints a reasonable picture of the
state of the art regarding our knowledge about the relationship
between climate change and conﬂict. The number of empirical
studies has increased tremendously in the years since the AR4 was
published in 2007, and the IPCC is in amuch better position to assess
the state of the art while living up to its goal of using mainly peer-
reviewed evidence. The main problem is the inconsistency of that
evidence. This is noted in the report, and it would probably have
been better to say that the main problem about the security impli-
cationsof climatechange is precisely the insecurity. Insteadof saying
that straight out, the IPCC is stuck with inconsistencies between
chapters, some not-too-well-grounded statements about indirect
effects, and a lot of loose language using terms like ‘may’ and ‘is
capable of’. The four main chapters that deal with conﬂict present
somewhat different messages, with Ch 19 the most alarmist and Ch
18 largely dismissive of the climate-change-conﬂict link, but there is
almost no cross-referencing, and the summary chapters (TS and
SPM) seem to rely mostly on the Human security chapter.
We started by noting the decline of group violence in the last
few decades. In the last three years, the number of battle deaths
has once again risen, mainly due to the bloody civil war in Syria. In
the background lurks the prospect of violence between China and
its various neighbors and between Russia and the Ukraine. None of
this actual and potential violence can be readily related to climate
change. The prospects for a continued ‘waning of war’ are pre-
carious, but not primarily because of a climate change. The Fifth
Assessment Report of the IPCC does not, on the whole, support a
pessimistic view of the future of conﬂict because of climate
change.
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Endnotes
1 There is a substantial literature criticizing the climate-security link from a
constructivist perspective. For instance, McDonald (2013: 42) ﬁnds that the most
powerful climate security discourses ‘are unlikely to inform progressive or effective
response to global climate change’. For a similar argument, see Demeritt (2006).
Our interest is in the theoretical and empirical merits of the climate-conﬂict nexus,
not in how and why people talk about it.
2 Using standard IPCC terminology, we refer to the Third Assessment Report as TAR,
the Fourth as AR4, and the Fifth as AR5. We do not discuss the ﬁrst two assessment
reports (1990, 1995), which contain very few if any comments on a possible
climate-conﬂict relationship.
3 ‘Conﬂict’ and other of our search terms occur occasionally in the report from AR4
WG III on mitigation, but much less frequently than in the WG II report.
4 In an analysis of ‘historical documents’ on climate change (including IPCC reports
up to 2007), Detraz and Betsill (2009) found only a dozen references to ‘conﬂict’.
However, in the IPCC reports they seem to have searched only the Summary for
policymakers. This gives a very simpliﬁed picture of these reports.
5 Of course, the risk of conﬂict in any given dyad was extremely small, and
remained very small even after adding the shared river risk factor. Thus, this wasnot a question of ‘water wars’ dominating the international arena, as had been
suggested by some of the policy-oriented literature.
6 This analysis is built on the version released on 31 March 2004 at www.ipcc-wg2.
gov/AR5/. At the ﬁnal meeting of Working Group II on 26e29 March, all chapters
were accepted in the version dated 29 October 2013, except the Summary for poli-
cymakers (SPM), which was edited at the meeting. The precise cut-off date for ma-
terial accepted for inclusion in the Human security chapter is not stated in the report,
but one of the chapter's two Coordinating Lead Authors conﬁrms that it was 31
August. A fewpapersmayhavebeencited thatwere still inpress, and thiswas allowed
if theywere lodged in an archive by IPCCe in effect they are treated the same as gray
literature (pers.comm. from Neil Adger, 2 April 2014 and 22 April 2014).
7 By contrast, Ch 22 on Africa contains numerous references to ‘grey’ literature.
8 Another possible criticism, suggested by a referee, is that climate change (directly
or indirectly) might inﬂuence inhibitors of conﬂict and that the effects could cancel
each other out. This is not discussed in the IPCC report.
9 The TS uses the same formulation, while the SPM talks of ‘global annual economic
losses’.
10 Recent empirical work on the risk of domestic or interstate conﬂict over water
(Bernauer, B€ohmelt, Buhaug, et al., 2012; Bernauer, B€ohmelt, & Koubi, 2012;
Brochmann & Gleditsch, 2012) offers little support for the ‘water wars’ argument,
and the whole tenor of the debate appears to have shifted towards an emphasis on
cooperation over shared water resources.
11 Hsiang et al. (2013) was published just before the cut-off for literature considered
by WG II. A number of experts in climate science and conﬂict studies were cited
early on with critical remarks in the German magazine Der Spiegel (Becker, 2013),
but a rebuttal to this article and to a follow-up article (Hsiang & Burke, 2014) from a
number of the people whose work has been included in the meta-analysis is only
now in press (Buhaug et al., 2014).
12 Apart from Chs 18 and 19 there is little discussion of climate change and indi-
vidual aggression. However, two chapters (Ch 9 on Rural areas and Ch 13 on
Livelihoods and poverty) brieﬂy refer to increased gender-based violence within
households in the aftermath of natural disaster.
13 Similarly, Ch 9 on Rural areas has several references to ‘conﬂicts or over scarce re-
sources’ (or similar formulations) and Ch 14 on Adaptation needs and option to ‘water
conﬂict’ e in both cases without implying violence, judging from the cited literature.
14 An article Daily Mail (Rose, 2014) reported charges that there were errors in some
of Tol's paper that had been used in drafting the economics papers and alleged that
Tol was now the victim of a smear campaign. In turn, the IPCC issued a press release
(IPCC, 2014c) explaining the IPCC procedures for correcting whatever errors might
be found in its reports or underlying material.
15 A complete archive of drafts, comments, and responses to the comments will
eventually be made available by the IPCC when the ﬁnal reports are published,
probably towards the end of 2014 (IPCC, 2013a, b).
16 Conﬁrmed by Jon Berg, Head of the Communications Department, Norwegian
Ministry of Climate and Environment, 4 April 2014.
17 Pers.comms. from Grete Hovelsrud, 1 April 2014. The journalist maintains,
however, that the statements attributed to her were derived from oral remarks she
made at the presentation of the report, pers. comm. Tor Sandberg, 7 April 2014.References
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